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Abstract
We review recent advances in the field of decision making under uncer-
tainty or ambiguity.
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1 Introduction
We survey recent advances in decision theory under uncertainty. This field has
seen a surge of research in the past twenty years or so, with both theoretical and
experimental advances. This literature still produces hot debates as can be seen
in the criticism expressed by Al Najjar and Weinstein (2009) and the replies by
important authors in the field, to be published in Economics and Philosophy in
20091 or, to a lesser extent, in the recent exchange between Epstein (2009) and
Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2009a).
∗We wish to thank Miche`le Cohen, Ste´phane Rossignol and Vassili Vergopoulos for useful com-
ments on a previous draft. This work has been supported by the chaire Axa “Assurance et Risques
Majeurs”.
1To summarize in very broad terms, Al Najjar and Weinstein (2009) question the relevance of
this literature and provide examples in which decisions made by ambiguity or uncertainty averse
decision makers appear to be silly. They also point to the problem of identifying beliefs in models
of ambiguity aversion due to the lack of natural updating rules. The replies in turn take issues
with the examples and discuss ways of dealing with arrival of new information.
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The non specialist observer might be overwhelmed by the number of different
models aimed at capturing how ambiguity can affect decisions. And even before
that, he might be baﬄed by terminology issues. Indeed, in the literature ambiguity
and uncertainty are not always distinguished, nor are they clearly defined. In this
survey, we will use both terms equivalently. Uncertainty or ambiguity is then meant
to represent “non probabilized” uncertainty –situations in which the decision makers
is not given a probabilistic information about the external events that might affect
the outcome of a decision–, as opposed to risk which is “probabilized” uncertainty.
We will thus concentrate on situations in which there is too little information to pin
down easily probabilistic beliefs (as opposed to risky situations, in which objects of
choice -lotteries- are already formulated in terms of probability distributions).
The aim of this survey is to provide a (more or less) user friendly guide of these
models, their properties and how they relate to one another, although we won’t for
the most part discuss axioms in details. We will also provide a (quick) presentation
of some of the major empirical findings in this field. Although our aim is certainly
not to be exhaustive, we feel the references gathered here are largely sufficient and
recent for the interested reader to pursue his own view of what the field is about.
The paper proceeds as follows. We start with a rather didactic section in which
we present the general approach to a decision problem under uncertainty, as well
as the “standard” Bayesian treatment. We end this section with a series of “prob-
lems” with the Bayesian/Savagian approach. We then discuss in Section 3 recent,
more general approaches that have been developed in the literature. We draw a dis-
tinction between fully subjective models and models incorporating explicitly some
information. Next, we move to the tricky issue of defining what is exactly ambiguity
aversion (Section 4) and how it is characterized in the various existing models. Even
more problematic is the dynamic of these types of models. We mention the problem
and some possible ways out in Section 5. Section 6 takes a glimpse at the huge
experimental literature and is meant more as a way to enter the literature than a
well-thought, thorough recension of the various issues raised by and results obtained
in this literature.
2 Setting the scene
This survey is concerned with decision under uncertainty, as “opposed” to risk.
Risk in the decision theoretical jargon represents situations in which information is
available, in the form of probability distributions. The decision maker thus chooses
among lotteries that is, probability distributions on some outcome space. The lead-
2
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ing model under risk is the expected utility model of von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1947). It has been challenged over the last thirty years by various forms of rank
dependent utility (prospect theory, dual theory, rank dependent expected utility,...)
which seems to fare better descriptively.
By contrast, uncertainty represents a situation in which no probabilistic informa-
tion is available to the decision maker. We discuss in this section the way traditional
decision theory has been dealing with such choice situations.
2.1 Modeling a decision problem under uncertainty
Formally, defining a choice problem is simple: there is a state space S, whose ele-
ments are called states of nature and represent all the possible realizations of uncer-
tainty; there is an outcome space X , whose elements represent the possible results
of any conceivable decision; and there is a preference relation % over the mappings
from S to X .
2.1.1 State space
Let us examine in more details this concept. The state space is given and is supposed
to include all relevant possible futures. This is of course an important limitation of
the classical approach. It leaves aside the issue of unforeseen contingencies, that is,
events that cannot be described or even thought of at the moment the decision is
taken. Modeling unforeseen contingencies has proved to be a challenge to decision
theory. Various attempts have been made recently (e.g., Dekel, Lipman, and Rusti-
chini (2001), or in a different vein Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo (2007)...) following
Kreps (1979) lead.
One conceptual (logical) issue when dealing with unforeseen contingencies is the
following: how can one take into account, when making a decision today, that things
can happen that the decision maker cannot even conceive of?
Although of interest especially when studying emerging risks, we will not deal
with this issue here2 and, for the rest of this survey, will assume that the state space
S covers all possible sources of uncertainty. An element s of S is a state of nature,
sometimes also called state of the world. Sets of states of nature, E ⊂ S are called
events. Denote A an algebra of events.
2We however will deal with some uncertainty about possible consequences.
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2.1.2 Outcome space
The outcome space X can be rather abstract. It captures all possible aspects of a
decision that affect the decision maker well-being. For most of the interpretation,
we can take X to be simply the set of real numbers (money for instance). But it
can also include state of health or any relevant aspect of the problem considered.
It will also be convenient to sometimes assume that X is a set of lotteries. Thus,
the result from a decision could for instance be, “if state s realizes, get a lottery
that yields some amount x with probability p and some amount y with probability
1−p”. When the outcome space has this convex structure, things can be technically
simpler. This approach has been advocated by Anscombe and Aumann (1963).
2.1.3 Preferences
In all the material we will survey, a decision maker is assumed to have preferences
over acts or decisions. An act is a mapping from S to X . It associates to each state
of nature a possible consequence. Thus, the decision maker compares decisions that
are rather extensive descriptions of what would occur if the decision was taken. Call
D the set of all possible (conceivable) decisions. f(s) is the outcome of decision f
in state s.
The preference relation is denoted % and f % g means that the decision maker
prefers decision f to decision g. Sticking to the (challenged) behaviorist approach
so pregnant in economics under the label of “revealed preferences”, this relation is
unknown to an observer, who can only observe choices made by the decision maker.
Thus the interpretation should be reversed: when I, as an outside observer, see that
a decision maker chooses f over g, then I can infer that he prefers f over g.
All preferences we consider in the rest of the survey are assumed to be complete
(the decision maker is always able to rank decisions –we will only allude to what
can be done if one drops this assumption), reflexive and transitive (if the decision
maker prefers f over g and g over h, then he also prefers f over h).
Example 1. We illustrate the concepts introduced in this section using a toy insur-
ance model that will be used throughout the paper. This example is not supposed to
be realistic but is the simplest one can think of to illustrate the abstract analysis.
Assume that an individual with initial wealth w is facing a risk of loss d. We as-
sume that this risk is the only relevant source of uncertainty for the problem studied.
The state space is then S =
{
L,L
}
with L = {loss} and L = {no loss} . If we take
the outcome to be money, an act specifies what amount of money the decision maker
has in each state of nature. A decision is then simply a couple (a, b) specifying the
4
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amount of money a if loss occurs and b when there is no loss.
One possible decision for the individual would be not to buy any insurance. This
can be represented by the decision f = (w− d, w). Another decision would be to buy
full coverage at a premium pi, yielding g = (w− pi, w− pi). A third possible decision
would be to buy partial coverage at a premium pi′, yielding h = (w−d+I−pi′, w−pi′)
where I is the indemnity paid in case of damage.
The decision maker has well-defined preferences over these three possible deci-
sions and will choose his most preferred option.
2.2 Savage
Savage (1954) book is still considered today to be one of the major achievements in
decision theory. With a scarcity of input, he delivers the classic subjective expected
utility representation of preferences. Savage thus ties together the idea of subjective
probability advocated by Ramsey and de Finetti with the idea of expected utility
derived (with given probabilities) by von Neumann and Morgenstern.
Since it is the starting point of all the models we will review next, it seems
indispensable to spend some time presenting it. The general idea of the line of
research we survey in this paper is to impose reasonable restrictions, “axioms”, on
preferences and derive from them some particular representations that will hopefully
be more tractable than mere preferences to investigate various choice problems e.g.
in the insurance domain.
We describe Savage’s core axioms. The most important one is often referred to
as the “sure thing principle”.
Axiom 1. Let f, g, f ′, g′ be decisions and E an event. Assume
f(s) = f ′(s) g(s) = g(s′) s ∈ E
and
f(s) = g(s) f ′(s) = g(s′) s /∈ E
then, f  g ⇔ f ′  g′.
This seems quite complicated. It is not. This principle is a separability prin-
ciple that has practical meaning: it says that when comparing two decisions, it is
not necessary to consider states of nature in which these decisions yield the same
outcome. This is illustrated in table 1 below. In this table, there are four states (1
to 4) and two events, E = {1, 2}, Ec = {3, 4}. The sure thing principle says that
if for whatever reason the decision maker prefers decision f to decision g, then he
5
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has to prefer f ′ over g′. The logic behind this is the fact that, in event Ec, f and
g yield the same outcomes. They thus differ only in case event E occurs (that is,
either state 1 or state 2 occurs).
Now look at f ′ and g′. They too differ only in case event E occurs. And if event
E occurs, then f is identical to f ′ and g is identical to g′. The axiom concludes that
the ranking of f ′ and g′ should be the same as the one of f and g.
E Ec
1 2 3 4
f 1 5 −4 3
g −3 8 −4 3
f ′ 1 5 5 6
g′ −3 8 5 6
Table 1: An illustration of the sure thing principle
Note this abstract principle has practical value since it allows to trim down the
set of states to “study” to discard the set of states in which the decisions over which
the choice bears all have the same consequences. We will see in the next section
that this principle prevents to model complementarity across states that could be
based for instance on lack of information.
Another core axiom in Savage’s construction is the idea that the likelihood rank-
ing of events does not depend on the consequences. More concretely, if you prefer
receiving 100 euros if event E occurs and 0 if not to receiving 100 euros if event F
occurs and 0 if not, then you should also prefer receiving say a car if event E occurs
and nothing if not to receiving a car if event F occurs and nothing if not.
Savage’s theorem can be expressed as follows. Assume % satisfies a number of
axioms (including the sure thing principle) then, there exists a probability measure
on S and a function u : X → R such that for any decision f and g
f % g ⇔
∫
S
u(f(s))dµ(s) ≥
∫
S
u(g(s))dµ(s)
In this formula, µ is interpreted as a subjective probability distribution over the
state space. It represents the decision maker’s beliefs. u is a utility function over
outcome, and represents the decision maker’s taste. Furthermore, µ is unique and
u is uniquely defined up to a positive affine transformation.
Note that this formula is, formally, nothing but an expected utility and thus
resembles von Neumann and Morgenstern expected utility under risk. This means in
particular that, when the outcome is simply money, the concavity of u is a measure of
the decision maker’s risk aversion (for given beliefs). This also means more generally,
6
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that decision under uncertainty can in some sense be reduced to decision under risk,
with one important caveat: beliefs are here a purely subjective construct.
Example 2. In our insurance example, a decision maker abiding by Savage’s ax-
ioms would choose among the three decisions mentioned according to the subjective
expected utility criterion. He would have a probability distribution on the state space,
i.e., (p, 1−p) where p is the probability of loss (state L) and a utility function defined
on money and would compute pu(w−d)+(1−p)u(w), pu(w−pi)+(1−p)u(w−pi),
pu(w − d+ I − pi′) + (1− p)u(w − pi′) to assess whether he chooses f , g, or h.
2.3 Issues with Savage
Although Savage’s beautiful construction is widely adopted in economics, it is not
without raising a number of issues. We will mention two of them here.
2.3.1 Where do beliefs come from?
The issue of subjective belief formation is not new and has been extensively dis-
cussed. See for instance Gilboa, Postlewaite, and Schmeidler (2008) for a presenta-
tion of some issues (and potential solutions) that are most relevant to economics.3
Savage result simply tells us that the behavior of the decision maker can be
represented as if he maximized a subjective expected utility. The only restrictions
it places on beliefs is that they be represented by a probability distribution. So it
allows strange or unreasonable beliefs, as long as they are probabilistic. One could
argue that such strange beliefs would converge to “true probabilities” upon learning
and Bayesian updating. This however cannot be a full answer for first, learning can
be taking quite a long time and second, Bayes’ law is silent when conditioning on
zero probability event.
More generally, one would probably gain a lot of insights if one could provide a
more precise account of the way individuals form their beliefs, when for instance,
frequentist evidence is not available but some relevant information is indeed avail-
able.
For emerging risks, on which data are scarce, the issue might be daunting. At
one extreme, if no information about the possibility of occurrence of some new risk is
available, a decision maker still “needs to” come up with a probability distribution
µ. His behavior would then be indistinguishable from his behavior in face of a
well documented risk with the same distribution µ. This somehow does not feel
3The interested reader might want also to look at some discussion among researchers in the
field on the forum http://groups.google.fr/group/decision_theory_forum?lnk=srg.
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right. Alternative decision models discussed below are meant to provide a (non
probabilistic) way out of this conundrum.
2.3.2 Ellsberg
Ellsberg (1961) proposed thoughts experiments that illustrate the fact that the sure
thing principle is not, in the end, such an intuitive principle.
In one experiment (the so-called two-urn experiments) a subject is presented
with two urns containing 100 balls each. In urn I, he can check that there are
50 white balls and 50 black balls. He, on the other hand, is not informed of the
composition of urn II. Placed in a choice situation, it seems plausible that a subject
would strictly prefer receiving the prize upon drawing a white ball from urn I than
receiving the same prize upon drawing a white ball from urn II, and similarly if one
replace white by black... This behavior which seems reasonable, is not compatible
with the idea that the subject has probabilistic beliefs on the composition of urn II.
In another experiment, the subject is facing an urn with 90 balls in it. He is told
(and can check) that there are 30 red balls. The remaining 60 are blue or yellow, in
unknown proportion. The subject is then asked to choose between f and g described
in table 2, and then between h and i. For instance, f is a bet yielding 100 euros if
the ball drawn is red and nothing otherwise.
30 60
Red Blue Y ellow
f 100 0 0
g 0 100 0
h 100 0 100
i 0 100 100
Table 2: Ellsberg three color urn
A modal choice observed in this type of experiment is that subjects prefer f over
g and i over h. This is a direct violation of the sure thing principle since h and i
are obtained from f and g by changing their common outcome of 0 in case a yellow
ball is drawn, to a common outcome of 1.
Again, a subject making these choices cannot have probabilistic beliefs. Imag-
ine that he had a distribution (pR, pB, pY ) on the state space (the color of the ball
drawn). Then, normalizing utility so that u(100) = 1 and u(0) = 0, direct compu-
tation shows that, under subjective expected utility, f ≻ g implies pR > pB, while
i ≻ h implies pR + pY < pB + pY , a contradiction.
Thus, Ellsberg experiments show that there exist (simple) situations where lack
8
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of information about relevant aspects of the problem might lead the decision maker
to behave in a way incompatible with subjective expected utility. The separabil-
ity principle entailed by the sure thing principle is here violated because of some
complementarity among events. In Ellsberg three color example, the event “Blue”
and the event “Yellow” are complement because some information is given on their
union, that cannot be further decomposed.
In this section, we have provided a fairly general setting in which one can think of
decision under uncertainty and then studied one possible (and indeed predominantly
assumed in economics) way of behaving when facing uncertainty. We also presented
issues raised by this type of behavior.
3 Non Bayesian decision criteria
Spurred by cognitive unease linked to treating situations with no available informa-
tion as identical to situations in which information is precise as well as experimental
results of the type reported in Ellsberg (1961), a number of models generalizing
Savage expected utility have been proposed over the last twenty years.
3.1 Wald maxmin and Arrow and Hurwicz α maxmin
An ancestor to this literature is the Wald maxmin criterion, generalized by Arrow
and Hurwicz (1972). This criterion is intuitive and conservative: when faced with a
decision that could yield consequences say {x, y, z}, evaluate it by looking exclusively
at the worst possible consequence. If x is worst than y which itself is worst than
z, then the value attributed to any decision whose outcomes lie in this set, will be
u(x). It does not matter that x will be the consequence in state 1 or state 2 or any
other event, as long as it is a possible consequence of the decision, this will be the
way the decision maker assesses the decision.
Arrow and Hurwicz’ generalization consists in incorporating not only the worst
but also the best outcome of the decision when evaluating it. In our example,
this means that a decision f that yields consequences in {x, y, z} will be evaluated
by αu(x) + (1 − α)u(z). The coefficient α, whose value lies between 0 and 1, is
interpreted as a measure of the decision maker’s pessimism.
These criteria can be arguably (yet somewhat unfairly as we’ll see below) crit-
icized as being too crude. Applied in a probabilistic setting for instance, Wald
criterion could be said to be overly pessimistic and would predict that a decision
maker is indifferent between betting on black (i.e., receiving say 100 euros if the ball
9
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drawn is black and 0 if it is white) in an urn that has 1 white ball and 99 black balls
and in an urn that has 99 white balls and 1 black ball. Introducing a pessimism
index does not break this indifference.
However, this argument could, in a sense, be used backward. Cohen and Jaffray
(1980) study a model of choice under complete ignorance. Ignorance is defined in
a behavioral way, as a situation in which the decision maker is indifferent between
betting on any two events as long as one is not included in the other. They then show
that, as an approximation, the Arrow and Hurwicz’ criterion is the only decision
criterion that is susceptible to model choice in situations in which no information
whatsoever is available on the events. Thus, the use of this criterion by a rational
decision maker would reveal that he faces a situation of complete ignorance.
3.2 Non additive beliefs
In this section we present “first generation” models, namely Choquet expected utility
and the cumulative prospect theory. Both rests on the use of capacities to represent
beliefs in the face of uncertain situations.
Choquet expected utility Historically, the first axiomatically sound model in
this vein is the Choquet expected utility model developed by Schmeidler (1989).
Weakening Savage’s sure thing principle, Schmeidler obtains representation where
beliefs are characterized not by a subjective probability but by a capacity, that is,
a non-necessary additive, increasing set function.4 More precisely, with this model,
a decision f is preferred to a decision g if and only if there exists a utility function
u : X → R and a capacity ν such that:
∫
Ch
u(f)dν ≥
∫
Ch
u(g)dν
Due to the non-additivity of the capacity ν the previous integral is not a standard
Lebesgue integral, but a Choquet one. The expression and the intuition behind
“Choquet expected utility” are easier to understand for decisions with finite set
of outcomes. Let S = {s1, s2, ..., sn} and f such that X(si) = xi, i = 1..n with
xi ≤ xi+1. Then the Choquet integral writes∫
Ch
u(f)dν = u(x1) + (u(x2)− u(x1))ν({s2, s3, . . . , sn}) + ...
4A capacity ν is a set function from the algebra A to [0, 1] such that ν(∅) = 0 and ν(S) = 1,
and if E ⊂ F , E,F ∈ A , ν(E) ≤ ν(F ). Note that the equality defining a probability distribution,
that is ν(E ∪ F ) = ν(E) + ν(F ) for any disjoint events E, F is not necessarily satisfied here. See
Jeleva and Rossignol (2009) for further references.
10
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+(u(xi+1)− u(xi))ν({si+1, . . . , sn}) + ... + (u(xn)− u(xn−1))ν({sn})
A decision maker evaluates a decision by considering first the lowest outcome and
then adding to this lowest outcome the successive possible increments, weighted by
his personal estimation of the occurrence of these increments. Due to the non-
additivity of the capacity, the weight of an outcome will depend on its place in
the ranking of all the possible outcomes of the decision. Note that, for an additive
capacity, we get back to subjective expected utility.
In the general case, for an infinite outcome space, the expression for the Choquet
integral is:
∫
Ch
u(f)dν =
0∫
−∞
(ν [{s ∈ S : u(f(s)) ≥ x}]− 1) dx+
+∞∫
0
ν [{s ∈ S : u(f(s)) ≥ x}] dx
where the integrals on the right-hand side are the usual Riemann integrals
One limit of the previous model is the difficulty to give an intuitive interpretation
for the capacity representing beliefs (see however Jaffray and Philippe (1997) for
an interpretation as a combination of lower and upper envelope of sets of priors).
On the other hand, the Choquet expected utility model allows some flexibility in
terms of modeling ambiguity attitudes5 (see e.g., the neo-capacities introduced by
Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007)) contrary to the multiple prior model
that we present below.
Cumulative Prospect Theory Cumulative Prospect Theory of Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) (under risk), and Kahneman and Tversky (1992) and Wakker and
Tversky (1993) is closely related to the Choquet expected utility model, to which is
appended a reference point and an asymmetry in the treatment of gains and losses.
It generalizes the Choquet Expected Utility by introducing two different capacities,
one for events corresponding to gains, and the other, for events corresponding to
losses. Let S = {s1, s2, ..., sn} and f such that f(si) = xi, i = 1..n with x1 ≤ ... ≤
xk ≤ 0 ≤ xk+1 ≤ ... ≤ xn. The criterion associates to f the following value:
V (f) = u(x1) +
k∑
i=2
ν−(∪kj=i{sj})(u(xi)− u(xi−1))
+
n∑
i=k+1
ν+(∪nj=i{sj})(u(xi)− u(xi−1)).
5See Section 4.
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where ν− and ν+ are two capacities. Note that if ν− = ν+ we get back to the
Choquet expected utility model. An issue with this model (widely used) is to know
what should be considered as gains and what should be considered as losses. This
supposes the existence of a reference point above which outcomes are treated as
gains and below which they are treated as losses.
3.2.1 Multiple priors
The next generation of models of decision under uncertainty are generalizations of
Savage expected utility (which α-maxmin is not). They therefore all adopt the point
of view that expected utility should be a possibility and should not be excluded a
priori from the axiomatic construction. In a first approximation, they all rest on
the idea that when information is scarce, it is too demanding to ask for a precise
subjective beliefs (a probability distribution) but maybe asking only for “imprecise”
subjective beliefs (i.e., a set of probability distributions) is more appropriate. They
vary in the way they deal with this set of priors. Denote this set C. For most of
what follows, we can assume without loss of generality that this set is compact and
convex. What can he do with this object? With a single prior, Savage tells us to
compute the expected utility of the various possible decisions and then pick the one
that yields the highest expected utility. With multiple priors, one can still compute
expected utilities, but we now have one value per prior. How does the decision maker
then compare two decisions, each one giving rise to a set of expected utilities?
It should be mentioned at the outset that this is very loose formulation: the
set of priors in the models we discuss in this section are part of the representation
result, i.e., this set and the way it is “used” all come together in the representation
theorem. The set of priors is not an independent object that has its own “objective”
existence.
Incomplete preferences One solution would be to say that a decision a is pre-
ferred to a decision b if all the expected utilities of a with respect to the distributions
in C are higher than those of b. This is what Bewley (1986) achieves. Hence, a is
preferred to b if no matter what distributions are used to compute their expected
utility, the number associated with a is always higher for a than for b. This means
that not all decisions can be compared. It can indeed happen that a is better than
b for a particular distribution but that b is better than a for another distribution in
the set of prior. In this event, the criterion is not binding and nothing can be said,
in the sense that a and b are incomparable. This is an example of incomplete pref-
erences. One cannot predict, on the basis of this type of preferences, the behavior
12
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of the decision maker for all possible choice problems.
Example 3. In our insurance example, assume the set of beliefs C is given by
{(p, 1− p)|p ∈ [1/3, 1/2]} where p is the probability of state L. If we take w = 3/2,
d = 1/2, and u(x) = x we get that the set of expected utilities associated with no
insurance is the interval [5/4, 4/3]. On the other hand, full insurance with pi implies
a “sure” (expected) utility equal to 3
2
− pi. If 3
2
− pi > 4
3
, then full insurance is
preferred. If 3
2
− pi < 5
4
, then no insurance is preferred to full insurance. But in the
case 4
3
> 3
2
− pi > 5
4
, Bewley’s criterion is silent as, depending on the prior used, it
is sometimes better to get full insurance and sometimes better to have no insurance.
Maxmin expected utility Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)’s way of handling the
set C is different. They provide an axiomatization of the following criterion. A
decision f is preferred to a decision g if and only if
min
p∈C
Epu(f) ≥ min
p∈C
Epu(g)
The set of priors C is uniquely defined and u is unique up to a positive affine trans-
formation. Thus, as opposed to Bewley’s criterion, this decision criterion always
gives a definite answer as to which decision is better. The decision maker will make
his choice between two decisions by comparing the minimal expected utility that
each decision yields.
In example 3 above, the decision criterion would unambiguously favor full insur-
ance since the worst expected utility attached to it is higher than the worst expected
utility of not getting any insurance (5/4). The axiomatization of the criterion is very
much in the Savage vein, namely putting axioms on a preference relationship and
then showing that preferences satisfying these axioms can be presented as a mini-
mum over a set of priors of expected utilities.
The key axiom in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) is an “uncertainty aversion”
axiom. It captures the intuition behind the usual explanation of the modal behavior
in Ellsberg two-urn experiment. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) axiomatization is
done in an Anscombe and Aumann (1963) setup in which consequences are lotteries
(see section 2.1.2). Hence, a decision f yields, in state s, a probability distribution
f(s) on some prizes. In this context, αf + (1− α)g for α ∈ [0, 1] has the following
meaning. If state s occurs, then the prize x will be obtained according to the draw
of the “compound lottery” αf(s)+(1−α)g(s). The latter can be interpreted as first
choosing with probability α to play the lottery f(s) and with probability (1 − α)
the lottery g(s) and second, play whichever lottery has been drawn.
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The uncertainty aversion axiom of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) reads as follows:
take two decisions f and g among which the decision maker is indifferent. Then,
the decision maker (weakly) prefers αf + (1 − α)g to f (or g). To illustrate this
axiom, think back to Ellsberg two-urn experiment. Let f be the decision that yields
(the degenerate lottery yielding for sure) 1 if the ball drawn from the unknown urn
is white and g the decision that yields (the degenerate lottery yielding for sure) 1
if the ball drawn from the unknown urn is black. Most people would be indifferent
between f and g. Now, consider the decision 1
2
f + 1
2
g. This decision yields in case
a white ball is drawn the following lottery: get 1 with probability 1/2 and 0 with
probability 1/2. Similarly, this decision yields in case a black ball is drawn the very
same lottery. Hence, the decision amounts to a risky bet, whose odds are known.
Mixing of the two “uncertain” decisions f and g allows one to come up with a new
decision which is not uncertain: this amounts to say that by cleverly combining
the two decisions, one can hedge (fully in the present case) against the uncertainty.
Thus this decision is actually the same as a 50:50 bet, that is, it is equivalent (in a
loose sense) to a bet in the known urn. Hence, the preference αf + (1 − α)g  f
captures the essence of Ellsberg type behavior.
As it were, the decision maker chooses which prior in the set he uses to evaluate
the decision f . For each decision f , there is one (or several) prior(s) that lead to
the minimum expected utility. So for a single choice, a maxmin expected utility
decision maker is indistinguishable from a plain expected utility decision maker.
The distinction can be made only when one observes at least two choices from the
decision maker, as in Ellsberg’s examples.
The functional form shares a common feature with the Wald criterion, which
is the presence of the min operator. However, this should not be misleading: the
maxmin expected criterion is not as extreme as the Wald criterion. It takes a
minimum with respect to a set of priors which is part of the representation. For
instance, if it reduces to a singleton, then the min operator is irrelevant. In this
case, we are back to a Savage style representation: the decision maker is a subjective
expected utility maximizer. To be sure, the attitude of the decision maker with
respect to uncertainty is encapsulated both in the operator min and in the set of
priors C. The latter is, in Gilboa and Schmeidler’s construction entirely subjective.
It does not have to relate to information the decision maker might have, in the same
way beliefs in Savage’s construction need not be related to any available information.
Indeed, this information is not part of the description of the decision problem. We
will come back to this issue below.
Example 4. Let us come back to our insurance example. If the individual’s subjec-
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tive set of beliefs C is given by {(p, 1−p)|p ∈ [p′, p′′]} and if he decides according to
the Maxmin Expected utility model, then he will evaluate the available decisions
as follows:
V (f) = min
p∈[p′, p′′]
pu(w − d) + (1− p)u(w) = p′′u(w − d) + (1− p′′)u(w)
V (g) = u(w − pi)
V (h) = min
p∈[p′, p′′]
pu(w − d+ I − pi′) + (1− p)u(w − pi′)
= p′′u(w − d+ I − pi′) + (1− p′′)u(w − pi′)
Ambiguity aversion in this example takes the form of a preference for certain
outcomes: the individual evaluates decisions only according to the worst possible
prior in the set, that is, to the highest loss probability p′′. This makes full insurance
more attractive.
α maxmin One peculiar aspect of the maxmin expected utility is that it includes
as a key axiom an axiom of uncertainty aversion. It is peculiar in the sense that one
would find peculiar if von Neumann and Morgenstern’s axiomatization of expected
utility included risk aversion as a key component.
Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) push this idea further and provide
a general analysis of what can be said about preferences that satisfy all of Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989)’s axioms but the uncertainty aversion axiom. They obtain a
general representation, which under further assumptions can be specialized to the
so-called α maxmin expected utility model, which takes the form: f is preferred to
a decision g if and only if
αmin
p∈C
Epu(f) + (1− α)max
p∈C
Epu(f) ≥ min
p∈C
Epu(g) + (1− α)max
p∈C
Epu(g)
The set of priors C and the coefficient α are uniquely defined and u is unique up
to a positive affine transformation. Obviously, this resembles the Arrow-Hurwicz
criterion, with again the caveat that the minimum and maximum are taken with
respect to a set of priors which is part of the representation. When α = 1 we are
back to the maxmin expected utility model. α is viewed in this representation as an
index of uncertainty aversion. This raises an interpretational issue. For a given set of
priors, higher values of α correspond to (some notion) of less aversion to uncertainty.
But α and C come at the same time and both embed some uncertainty aversion.
Another, related, issue that arises in this model is the link with the expected utility
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benchmark. α = 1/2 does not have any particular meaning and is certainly not
associated to a decision maker that would be expected utility (unless, trivially, the
set of priors is reduced to a singleton, but then any α would go). An extension of
this work can be found in Amarante (2009).
Maxmin expected utility and Choquet expected utility As already men-
tioned, the Choquet expected utility model of Schmeidler (1989) is related to the
maxmin expected utility model. More precisely, under the assumption of uncertainty
aversion, the Choquet expected utility model is a particular case of the maxmin ex-
pected utility model. In that case, the set of priors over which the decision maker
takes the minimum has a particular property: it is the core of a convex game or
capacity. However, Choquet expected utility does not presuppose uncertainty aver-
sion, and is, in that sense, more general than maxmin expected utility.
Confidence function Chateauneuf and Faro (2009) provide the following repre-
sentation:
V (f) = min
p∈Lα
1
ϕ(p)
∫
S
u(f)dp
u is the usual utility function, while Lα can be interpreted as the set of priors held
by the decision maker. This set depends also on the function ϕ, the confidence
function, in the following manner: Lα = {p : ϕ(p) ≥ α}. The value of ϕ(p) captures
the relevance of prior p for the decision. α is a threshold level of confidence under
which priors are not taken into account in the evaluation. This criterion generalizes
the maxmin expected utility criterion of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) –the latter
(with set of prior C) is obtained for ϕ(p) = 1 if p ∈ C and 0 if not and any α ∈ [0, 1].
3.2.2 Model uncertainty
We have left the question of how to determine the set of priors in the maxmin
expected utility model open. Indeed, it comes from the representation of the decision
maker’s preferences and has, in general, no particular structure.
One convenient formulation, with a nice interpretation, is the so-called ε-contamination
(see e.g. Eichberger and Kelsey (1999)). In this formulation, the decision maker has
a probabilistic benchmark in the sense that he “believes” the probability distribution
on the state space is a given distribution, say p. But he’s not totally confident about
this. The way to model this is to say that the set of priors he has in mind will be a
combination between the “probabilistic benchmark” on one hand and “anything can
happen” on the other hand. If one denotes ∆(S) the set of all distributions on the
state space S, the set of priors corresponding to the story above is (1− ε)p+ ε∆(S).
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ε is a measure of how confident the decision maker is in his probabilistic assessment
of the situation. For ε = 0 he behaves as if he were sure of the distribution while
for ε = 1, he behaves as if he had no idea of it. Another way to put it is that the
decision maker has a “model” in mind, represented by p and is unsure about the
adequation of his model.
Robust control The idea of model uncertainty has been followed by Hansen and
Sargent (e.g., Hansen and Sargent (2001) and (2008)), building on work done by
engineers on “robust control”. In this robust preferences approach, agents have a
model p in mind and rank decisions f according to the criterion
V (f) = min
q∈∆(S)
[∫
u(f)dq + θR(q||p)
]
where R(.||p) : ∆(S) → [0,∞] is the relative entropy (or Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence) with respect to p, R(q||p) =
∫
q(x) log q(x)
p(x)
dx. This is a measure of the
“distance” between the two distributions p and q. Hence, in this criterion, the de-
cision maker takes into account the possibility that p is not the right distribution
and consider possible other distributions q. The relative likelihood of distribution q,
rather than p, governing the occurrence of states of nature is given by the relative
entropy of q with respect to p. The parameter θ on the other hand is a measure
of how much the decision maker weights the possibility of p not being the correct
distribution. The larger θ the more the decision maker attaches importance to p
being the correct model (i.e., the cost of considering a model q different from p is
given more weight in the functional). Hansen and Sargent have applied this criterion
to the study of dynamic macroeconomic problems.
Variational preferences As mentioned by Hansen and Sargent themselves, their
model can be given an interpretation in terms of ambiguity aversion. Wang (2003)
and especially Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2005) have developed the
formal setting in which the precise link between the robust control approach and
the maxmin expected utility model can be made. The maxmin expected utility
criterion can be written in the following manner:
V (f) = min
p∈∆(S)
[∫
u(f)dp+ δC(p)
]
where δC(p) = 0 if p ∈ C and δC(p) =∞ if p /∈ C.
The formal analogy with Hansen and Sargent’s approach is thus clear: both are
a particular case of a general model in which the decision maker’s preferences are
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represented by
V (f) = min
p∈∆(S)
[∫
u(f)dp+ c(p)
]
where c(p) is a “cost function” defined on ∆(S). If c(p) = 0 for all p ∈ ∆(S) then
the criterion is simply maxmin expected utility with the set of priors equal to ∆(S),
which is the same as Wald criterion (extreme pessimism). If on the other hand
c(q) = 0 if q = p and c(q) = ∞ otherwise, then the criterion is simply expected
utility with respect to the distribution p. Finally, the ε-contamination case with
which we started this section can be recovered by specifying c(q) = δ(1−ε)p+ε∆(S)(q)
3.2.3 Second order beliefs
One can look at the Ellsberg three color urn experiment in a different manner than
the way we presented it. The decision maker might reason as follows: the urn might
have different compositions (from all sixty balls being blue to all sixty balls being
yellow). Once the composition is fixed, the decision maker faces a situation of risk,
with known odds. The process can be represented as a two stage process: first the
composition of the urn is drawn (among a set of hypothetical urns) then the subject
draws in the urn.
If the decision maker has probabilistic beliefs on the set of all possible urn com-
positions and perform reduction of compound lotteries (ie is indifferent between a
two stage lottery and its one stage equivalent), then we are back to expected util-
ity: the decision maker acts as if he had a probability distribution over the color of
the ball drawn in mind. If for instance we assume a uniform distribution over the
possible compositions of the urn, i.e., it is equally likely that there are n or m blue
balls (n,m ∈ {0, , ..., 60}), then a decision maker performing reduction of compound
lotteries would have probabilistic beliefs of 1/3 on blue and 1/3 on yellow.
Segal (1987) and Segal (1990) intuition was that Ellsberg paradox could be ex-
plained in this way. This has been developed notably by Nau (2006) and Klibanoff,
Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). The latter has become a rather popular model, in
particular because it avoids the technical problem (non differentiability) introduced
by the min operator in the maxmin expected utility model.
In this model, one can still think of the decision maker having a set of prior C,
over the state space S, in mind. The decision maker also comes up with a prior
over the set of priors, a so-called second order belief, denoted µ. To understand
the construction, think of each prior p ∈ C as describing a possible scenario (in the
Ellsberg case, a possible composition of the urn) and µ as the (probabilistic) belief
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of the decision maker over the different scenarii. In the simple case of a finite set of
states and a finite set of scenarii, the decision criterion to be maximized takes the
following form: ∑
θ∈Θ
µ(θ)Φ
(∑
s∈S
p(s; θ)u(f(s))
)
where f is a decision yielding payoff f(s) in state s, u is the utility function and
Φ is a function from R to R. Φ will be key to assess the decision maker’s attitude
toward ambiguity. In a more compact way, using the expectation operator, we can
write the formula as EµΦ (Ep(u(f))).
As the reformulation above makes it clear, the criterion can be read as a two-
layer expected utility: first the decision maker evaluates the expected utility of the
decision with respect to all the priors in C: each prior p is indexed by θ so in the
end, we get a set of expected utilities of f , each being indexed by θ. Then, instead
of taking the minimum of these expected utilities, as maxmin expected utility does,
take an expectation of distorted expected utilities. The role of Φ is crucial here: if
Φ were linear, the criterion would simply reduce to expected utility maximization
with respect to the combination of µ and possible p’s. When Φ is not linear, one
cannot combine µ and p’s to construct a reduced probability distribution. In this
event, the decision maker takes the expected “Φ-utility” (with respect to µ) of the
expected “u-utility” (with respect to p’s).
A concave Φ will reflect ambiguity aversion, in the sense that it places a larger
weight on bad expected “u-utility” realizations. In the limit, when Φ is such that
is places all the weights on the worst expected “u-utility”, the criterion amounts to
Gilboa and Schmeidler’s maxmin expected utility. We will come back in section 4 on
the interpretation in terms of ambiguity attitudes of the various constructs presented
here. At this stage, we just mention that, as in Gilboa and Schmeidler’s analysis,
all functions and probability distributions appearing in the formula are subjective
constructs, deriving from behavioral axioms. Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji
(2005)’s axioms are less direct than Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)’s as they need
to introduce “second order acts” (that is, in the Ellbserg example, decisions whose
outcomes depend not on the color of the ball drawn, but only on the composition
of the urn) and relate them with usual decisions whose outcomes depend on the
realization of a state s ∈ S. Seo (2009) manages to go around this issue and
proposes an axiomatization in which the domain on which decisions are defined
is simply the intuitive state space (i.e., in Ellsberg example, the color of the ball
drawn). Ergin and Gul (2009) also provide a different approach to derive essentially
the same decision criterion. Epstein (2009) critically discusses some implications
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of this model (with a reply by the authors in Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji
(2009a).)
Example 5. If the probability of loss p in our insurance example can take two values,
p′ and p′′ and if the individual believes that it will be p′ with probability q, then, the
evaluations of the three available insurance decisions with the previous criterion will
be:
V (f) = qΦ [p′u(w − d) + (1− p′)u(w)] + (1− q)Φ [p′′u(w − d) + (1− p′′)u(w)]
V (g) = Φ [u(w − pi)]
V (h) = qΦ [p′u(w − d+ I − pi′) + (1− p′)u(w − pi′)] +
(1− q)Φ [p′′u(w − d+ I − pi′) + (1− p′′)u(w − pi′)]
3.3 Incorporating some (imprecise) information
In the purely subjective approaches, preferences are expressed over acts, associat-
ing outcomes to any possible state of nature. The available information influences
preferences over the acts and thus participates to belief formation. It does so in a
very general yet un-modeled way. Thus, the price to pay for this generality is the
impossibility to establish an explicit relation between the information possessed on
the one hand and the agent’s beliefs on the other hand. Indeed, beliefs are the result
of a combination between objective information provided for instance by survey data
and personal subjective assessment of this information. In subjective models, only
the final beliefs appear in the preferences representation. Consequently, comparing
situations with different available information or evaluating the impact of objective
information on belief formation is a difficult task. It is then difficult to have a precise
idea of what beliefs associated to a given information situation should be.
For instance, when looking at the Ellsberg urn choice problem, it is natural to
consider for the set of probability distributions
C =
{
P : P (R) =
1
3
, P (B) =
2
3
− β, P (Y ) = β, β ∈
[
0,
2
3
]}
.
However, nothing excludes the possibility that C =
{
P : P (R) = P (B) = P (Y ) = 1
3
}
or C =
{
P : P (R) = 1
3
, P (B) = 1
3
− β, P (Y ) = 1
3
+ β, β ∈
[
0, 1
6
]}
.
The previous problems can, at least partially, be solved by having preferences
defined over objects explicitly taking into account all the available information.
Linear utility for belief functions A first step in this direction is taken in Jaf-
fray (1989). His model generalizes the standard expected utility under risk to a
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framework in which the probabilities of the different states of nature are imperfectly
known. Instead, it is only possible to assert that they belong to given intervals.
In such a context, the information is compatible with a set of probability distri-
butions, that can be denoted by P. To any set of probability distributions, it
is possible to associate its lower envelope ν6 , associating to each event, its lower
probability compatible with the set of distributions. This lower envelope has some
mathematical structure associated to it. In particular, it is a capacity, (an increas-
ing, non-necessarily additive set function.) Under some assumptions on this lower
envelope, it is possible to associate to any decision f ∈ D not a probability distri-
bution over the outcomes, as under risk, but a capacity νf over the outcomes. This
capacity simply gives the smallest probability of each outcome if this decision is cho-
sen. Applying the usual von Neumann Morgenstern axioms plus a dominance axiom
to the preferences over the set of capacities νf yields a preferences representation
which combines expected utility and complete ignorance. The value associated to a
decision is the sum over all the possible events (on the outcome set) of a probability
weight associated to the event times a utility depending only on the best and the
worst outcome, respectively mE and ME corresponding to this event.
V (νf) =
∑
E∈A
ϕ(E)U(mE ,ME)
For elementary events, ϕ is the lower probability of the event, ϕ(E) = ν (E) and
mE = ME . For other events, ϕ(E) measures the ambiguity of the event in the sense
that it depends on the gap between the lower probability of this event and the sum
of the lower probabilities of its sub-events. Technically,
ϕ(E) = ν(E)−
∑
B⊂E
(−1)|E\B|−1ν(B). (1)
ϕ is called the Mo¨bius transform of the capacity ν. Under further assumptions on
the capacity, one can establish that ϕ takes only positive values and adds up -over
events- to 1. It therefore can be assimilated to a probability distributions on all
events (and not simply the elementary ones).
U(mE ,ME) is computed using Hurwicz αmaxmin criterion applied to the set of
possible consequences if E occurs. The underlying idea is that if event E occurs,
the decision maker faces a set of consequences without any information about their
respective probabilities. He then chooses by considering the best and the worst
consequence and weight them according to his pessimism-optimism index α. Thus,
6The lower envelope of a set of probability distributions being a capacity, we use the same
notation ν as for the capacity in the Choquet expected utility model.
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U(mE ,ME) = α(mE ,ME)u(mE) + (1− α(mE ,ME))u(ME).
If the pessimism-optimism index α is an intrinsic characteristic of the individual
and does not depend on the consequences, that is α(mE,ME) = α for anymE < ME ,
the previous criterion is equivalent to an αmaxmin criterion with objective imprecise
information,
V (νf ) = αmin
P∈P
EPu(f) + (1− α)max
P∈P
EPu(f)
When the set P reduces to a single distribution this criterion naturally reduces
to expected utility. In this case, the lower envelope ν is additive with ν(E) = P (E)
for any E and ϕ(E) = ν(E) for elementary events and ϕ(E) = 0 for all other events.
Example 6. Let us go back to our insurance example. The individual’s informa-
tion allows him to assert that the probability of a loss is in between p′ and p′′.
This information can be described by the set P of probability distributions with
P =
{
P : P (L) ∈ [p′, p′′] , P (L) ∈ [1− p′′, 1− p′]
}
. To this set can be associated
the following lower envelope and Mo¨bius transform:
event ∅ L L L ∪ L
ν 0 p′ 1− p′′ 1
ϕ 0 p′ 1− p′′ p′′ − p′
In this simple case of two states of nature, the value of ϕ(L ∪ L) gives a measure
of the uncertainty (or ambiguity) in the problem. It corresponds to the probability
mass that can not be objectively assigned to one or the other of the elementary events.
With the previous criterion, and assuming that α does not depend on wealth levels,
the insurance decisions f, g and h are evaluated as follows:
V (f) = (αp′′ + (1− α)p′)u(w − d) + (1− αp′′ − (1− α)p′)u(w)
V (g) = u(w − pi)
V (h) = (αp′′ + (1− α)p′)u(w − d+ I − pi′) + (1− αp′′ − (1− α)p′)u(w − pi′)
α corresponds here to the weight affected by the individual to the highest probability
of the worst outcome. A pessimistic individual (α = 1) will act as if the true loss
probability was p′′, and an optimistic individual (α = 0), as if the true probability was
p′. Note that, for α = 1 we get the same evaluation as with the Maxmin Expected
Utility criterion. However, the informational assumptions are completely different:
the set of possible values for p is completely objective.
The main originality of this criterion is to take explicitly into account the avail-
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able but partial information, by defining preferences on capacities rather than on dis-
tribution functions or on acts. Individuals are then characterized by two functions:
a utility function characterizing attitude toward risk and a Hurwicz pessimism-
optimism index, related to attitude towards ambiguity. It is built on the intuition
that individuals use directly (without any subjective transformations) the available
(precise or imprecise) information on the probabilities. However, this model is un-
able to take into account a subjective treatment of objective imprecise information.
The “contraction” model. To combine the advantages of Jaffray’s model with
those of the subjective multiple prior of Gilboa and Schmeidler, Gajdos, Hayashi,
Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008) propose a model (call it for simplicity the “contraction
model”) in which it is possible to compare acts under different objective information
structures.7 More precisely, agents are assumed to be able to compare pairs (P, f)
where P is a set of probability distributions and f is an act in the sense of Savage.
In the spirit of Gilboa & Schmeidler multiple prior model, the authors give
axiomatic foundations for the following preference representation:
V (f) = min
P∈Φ(P)
EPu(f)
Φ is a mapping that transforms the objective information, given by P, into a
subjective set of priors. Under some additional axioms, Φ can be given the spe-
cific form of a weighted sum of a kind of “mean value” of the probability set P
(characterized by the so-called “Steiner point”) and the set itself:
Φ(P) = αP+(1− α)s(P)
where αmeasures imprecision aversion. The corresponding preference representation
takes the form:
V (f) = α min
P∈P
EPu(f) + (1− α) Es(P) u(f)
Here, individuals combine a “bayesian” criterion (the information is summarized by
an objectively calculated single distribution independent of the decisions) with a
pessimistic criterion (for any decision, individuals take into account the distribution
giving the lowest expected utility).
Example 7. Consider the insurance problem with the informational assumption
7For a related approach, that mixes “objective’ and “subjective” rationality, see, Gilboa, Mac-
cheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler (2008).
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as described in example 6. s(P)(L) =
p′ + p′′
2
, s(P)(L) = 1 −
p′ + p′′
2
and the
decisions are evaluated as follows:
V (f) = (αp′′ + (1− α)
p′ + p′′
2
)u(w − d) + (1− αp′′ − (1− α)
p′ + p′′
2
)u(w)
V (g) = u(w − pi)
V (h) = (αp′′ + (1− α)
p′ + p′′
2
)u(w − d+ I − pi′)+
(1− αp′′ − (1− α)
p′ + p′′
2
)u(w − pi′)
For α = 1 individuals choose according to p′′ and for α = 0, according to the average
probability
p′ + p′′
2
. Note that, in contrast with the previous model, they never act
according to p′.
Unforeseen contingencies In the previous models, uncertainty concerns the
probabilities of the different events. There are however situations where it concerns
not only probabilities, but also consequences. The more recent example is that of
A-influenza. The event “spreading of the disease” has an unknown probability and
moreover, the consequences in terms of number of death is imprecisely known. At
least, two approaches have been proposed to model decisions in such situations.
The correspondences approach
Ghirardato (2001) deals with the possibly underspecified decision problems by
assuming that the decisions are not acts but correspondences associating to a state
of nature a set of consequences rather than a single consequence. Applying the
Savage axioms and two more specific dominance axioms to the preferences over a set
of such correspondences allows, we get a preference representation by a generalized
expectation with respect to a non-additive measure. If one denotes by A the algebra
of the subsets of X and if X is a typical element of A , the value associated to a
decision f (which is a correspondence from S into X that associates to any s an
element of A ) is the following:
V (f) =
∫
A
[
α(X) inf
x∈X
u(x) + (1− α(X)) sup
x∈X
u(x)
]
dϕf (X)
where α(X) is a pessimism index attached to the consequence set X, and ϕf is a
probability measure on (A , 2A ) associated to f. Note that due to the non uniqueness
of the consequences of f , ϕf is not a probability measure on (X , 2
X ).
24
Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.64 (Version révisée)
In the special case of constant pessimism index: α(X) = α for any X in A , the
value function writes:
V (f) = α
∫
Ch
u(x)dνf(x) + (1− α)
∫
Ch
u(x)dνf(x)
where νf is the capacity such that νf (X) = P ({s ∈ S : f(s) ⊆ X}) and νf its com-
plementary capacity (νf(X) = 1−νf (X
c), Xc = X \X). The integrals are Choquet
integrals, as defined section 3.2.
Partially analyzed decisions
Another modeling approach is proposed by Jaffray and Jeleva (2009). They con-
sider that decisions are represented by incompletely analyzed acts: conditionally on
a given event A, the consequences of the decision on sub-events are perfectly known
and uncertainty becomes probabilizable, whereas the plausibility of this event itself
remains vague and the decision outcome on the complementary event A¯ is impre-
cisely known. The decision criterion is made of two components i) the conditional
expected utility associated with the analyzed part of the decision; and ii) the best
and worst consequences of its non-analyzed part.
More precisely, for a decision f , analyzed on an event A with consequence range
Cf on A¯ with best and worst consequences denoted mf , Mf respectively :
V (f) = Φ
(
A,
∫
A
u ◦ f dPf , mf , Mf
)
where Pf is a subjective probability and Φ is weakly increasing with
∫
A
u◦f dPf , mf , Mf .
Various specifications of the model express various types of beliefs concerning the
relative plausibility of the analyzed and the non-analyzed events ranging from prob-
abilities to complete ignorance.
- Case of P (A) precisely known:
V (f) = P (A)
∫
A
u ◦ f dPf + (1− P (A))ϕ(mf , Mf )
where u and ϕ express attitudes towards risk and ambiguity respectively.
- Case of complete ignorance on (A, A¯). Only best and worst evaluations on A
or A¯ are relevant which leads to:
V (f) = ϕ(max{u(Mf),
∫
A
u ◦ f dPf}, min{u(mf),
∫
A
u ◦ f dPf}).
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3.4 Ambiguity, probabilistic sophistication and source de-
pendence
We finally mention another line of research, that takes a somewhat different ap-
proach to explaining ambiguity related phenomena. Ellsberg examples constitute
actually more than a violation of expected utility. It violates “probabilistic sophis-
tication” a term coined by Machina and Schmeidler (1992) to describe the behavior
of decision makers that behave in a way consistent with a probability distribution,
but not necessarily by treating it linearly. A decision maker that would “distort” a
probability distribution, like in Prospect Theory or Rank Dependent Utility theories
would qualify as being probabilistically sophisticated although he is not an expected
utility decision maker.
Recent theoretical research has given foundations for an idea that was already
present in the experimental and psychological literature, namely, the idea of “source
dependence”. The aim here is to identify domains or, to use Savage’s terminology,
“small worlds” in which the decision maker has well-formed probabilistic beliefs.
Thus, within each small world, the decision maker does not perceive ambiguity. He
will however possibly reveals source-dependent risk attitudes: across domains, he
might not hold probabilistic beliefs. For a general treatment, we refer the reader to
Chew and Sagi (2006) and Chew and Sagi (2008). There, the idea that ambiguity
aversion might be interpreted in terms of comparative risk aversion across small
worlds is given an axiomatic treatment based on de Finetti’s idea of exchangeability.
This can be easily explained in the Ellsberg two urn examples. Imagine that
behavior reveals that the decision maker is indifferent between betting on a black
ball being drawn from the unknown urn and betting on white being drawn from the
same urn. We could be entitled to say that the decision maker acts as if he had
equiprobable beliefs on these two events. But then, how can we take into account
the fact that the decision makers strictly prefers betting (on any color) in the known
urn rather than in the unknown urn?
The source dependent story would go as follows: the decision maker probabilistic
assessment of the unknown urn (to simplify, putting a probability .5 on each color)
is valid only in this “small world”. Note they are the same as the beliefs in the other
domain made of the known urn. However, the way the decision maker acts on these
beliefs is different across the two domains. Hence, identifying the two urns as two
different sources of uncertainty and recognizing that risk aversion might be different
across domains would explain the behavior usually observed in these experiments.
As we will discuss in section 6, one can for instance assume that the decision maker
distorts probability in a different manner for the two urns.
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Interestingly, Ergin and Gul (2009) link the “source dependent” (or issue depen-
dence as they name it) approach with the second order belief approach to ambiguity
aversion.
4 Ambiguity attitudes
4.1 Definitions
Defining ambiguity aversion is a difficult task. To understand the origin of the
difficulties it can be useful to come back to the principles of the definition of risk
aversion.
An individual is classified as risk averse either when he prefers a riskless lottery
to a risky one (this corresponds to weak risk aversion), or when he prefers a less
risky lottery to a more risky one (this corresponds to strong risk aversion).
Weak risk aversion requires the definition, for any lottery L, of a reference riskless
lottery: it usually corresponds to a certain outcome equal to the expected value
of the lottery (EP (L)). Strong risk aversion requires a notion of increase in risk,
that is, a criterion allowing to compare the risk of two lotteries. Several notions
have been proposed, as the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) mean preserving increase
in risk, the monotone mean preserving increase in risk, the left monotone mean
preserving increase in risk8 etc. Note that in this approach to risk aversion, both
the definition of a riskless lottery and of an increase in risk need to be “objective”,
that is, independent of individuals’ preferences.
To apply the same procedure to ambiguity aversion, it is necessary to define
unambiguous acts as well as ambiguity reduction. The task is difficult due to the
absence, in the general ambiguity framework, of any objective probabilistic infor-
mation. One of the first attempts to define “objectively” ambiguity aversion is due
to Schmeidler (1989), followed by Wakker (1990), Chateauneuf (1994), Chateauneuf
and Tallon (2002), Grant and Quiggin (2005) etc.
Epstein (1999) Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) propose other definitions, based
on a more “subjective” procedure, inspired from the one proposed by Yaari (1969) to
define risk aversion. Another procedure is adopted by Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and
Vergnaud (2008), who consider not a general ambiguity framework, but an imprecise
probability one.
In the following, we present these definitions, and give some characterizations in
different decision models.
8A presentation of these notions and of the associated characterizations in different decision
models under risk can be found in Chateauneuf, Cohen, and Meilijson (2004).
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f g 1
3
f + 2
3
g 1
2
f + 1
2
g
Black ball 0 120 80 60
White ball 120 0 40 60
Table 3: Hedging in the Ellsberg two-color urn example
• Schmeidler’s definition of ambiguity aversion
An individual is ambiguity averse if he has a preference for diversification.
More precisely, a preference relation % corresponds to ambiguity aversion if
for any acts f and g :
f % g ⇒ αf + (1− α)g % g.
This definition implies that it is possible for an ambiguity averse individual
to observe both f ∼ g and αf + (1 − α)g ≻ g. The underlying idea is that
a convex combination of acts either preserves ambiguity, either decreases it,
sometimes giving even a certain consequence as it appears in the following
example.
Consider the Ellsberg two-color urn with unknown proportions of white and
black balls and the decisions f and g as well as their convex combinations given in
the following table:
In this simple example, it seems reasonable for an individual to be indifferent
between fand g. If this individual is ambiguity averse, he could in addition strictly
prefer 1
3
f + 2
3
g and 1
2
f + 1
2
g to both f and g.
A weaker definition of ambiguity aversion, based on preference for perfect diver-
sification, is proposed by Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002). An individual is said to
be (weakly) ambiguity averse if, for any acts fi, i = 1..n, such that ∃αi ∈ R+, i =
1..n,
∑n
i=1 αi = 1 and
∑n
i=1 αifi = x, x ∈ X
f1 ∼ f2 ∼ ... ∼ fn ⇒ x ≻ fi, i = 1..n
The previous definitions of ambiguity aversion are essentially based on the out-
comes of the acts, and not on the beliefs. They do not lead to intuitive choices when
risk and risk aversion are involved.
The main criticism addressed to Schmeidler’s definition by Epstein (1999) is
that for individuals with CEU preferences, this type of ambiguity aversion is neither
necessary, nor sufficient, to explain the choices observed in the Ellsberg three-colors
urn experiment.
28
Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.64 (Version révisée)
• Epstein and Ghirardato and Marinacci definitions of ambiguity aversion
Epstein (1999) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) propose to follow another
procedure inspired by Yaari (1969)’s definition of risk aversion.
To avoid the arbitrary definition of the reference riskless lotteries and of increase
in risk, Yaari (1969) proposes a more subjective approach for the definition of risk
aversion. It consists of three steps:
- step 1: the definition of comparative risk aversion: Individual 2 is more risk
averse than individual 1 if for any lottery L and any outcome x, L %1 x⇒ L %2 x.
- step 2: definition of risk neutral preferences %rnas follows L1 %
rn L2 ⇔
EP (L1) ≥ EP (L2);
- step 3: definition of absolute risk aversion: an individual is risk averse if he is
more risk averse than a risk neutral individual.
Both Epstein (1999) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) adapt this procedure
to ambiguity aversion, the differences in their approaches consisting in the definitions
of absence of ambiguity, and of ambiguity neutral preferences.
1. In Epstein’s definition of ambiguity aversion
- comparative ambiguity aversion is defined using unambiguous acts, that is
acts, measurable with respect to an exogenously defined set of unambiguous
events;
- ambiguity neutral preferences are probabilistically sophisticated preferences,
that is preferences of an individual who assigns subjective probabilities to the
events.
2. In Ghirardato and Marinacci’s definition of ambiguity aversion
- comparative ambiguity aversion is defined using constant acts;
- ambiguity neutral preferences are SEU preferences (a special case of proba-
bilistically sophisticated preferences).
With both these definitions, the ambiguity attitudes of two individuals can be
compared only if some assumptions are made on their preferences under risk. In
Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) conditions guarantee that the individuals have
the same attitude towards risk, in Epstein (1999), individuals’ preferences have to
coincide on the set of unambiguous acts. Thus, these definitions do not allow to
separate completely attitudes towards risk from attitudes towards uncertainty.
• Gajdos et al.’s definition of (imprecision) aversion
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Separation between attitudes towards risk and uncertainty is achieved in Gajdos,
Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008) who define comparative imprecision aversion
using bets on events with precise probabilistic information. Their definition allows
a separation between risk and ambiguity attitudes as well as a separation between
imprecision (ambiguity) neutrality and the absence of imprecision. This definition
is possible because they consider a setting of objective, but imprecise information
where preferences are defined not on acts, but on pairs (set of probability distribu-
tions, act). More precisely,
- comparative imprecision aversion is defined using a bet on an event with known
probability;
- imprecision neutrality: the decision maker’s set of prior is reduced to a singleton.
4.2 Characterization in different models
Due to the different settings in which they are defined, it is not possible to give the
characterizations of all types of ambiguity attitudes in all the decision models under
uncertainty that were presented before.
The first point to note is that subjective expected utility preferences are unable to
take into account ambiguity aversion, whichever definition is used. There, the utility
function characterizes only attitudes towards risk and wealth. Thus, all individuals
with subjective expected utility preferences are ambiguity neutral.
4.2.1 Ambiguity aversion in the Choquet Expected Utility model
In the Choquet expected utility model, ambiguity aversion is mainly captured by the
properties of the capacity characterizing individuals’ beliefs. Two types of capacities
seem relevant for ambiguity aversion:
• convex capacities;
• capacities with non empty cores (convex capacities are a subset of these ca-
pacities).
An individual with Choquet expected utility preferences is Ambiguity Averse
(AA) in the sense of Schmeidler if his capacity ν is convex and if his utility function
is concave or linear.
Concerning the properties of the capacity, the characterization of AA is similar
to Epstein’s definition under the assumption of the existence of a sufficiently rich
set of unambiguous events (events to which a unique probability can be associated).
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An individual with Choquet expected utility preferences is weakly ambiguity
averse in the sense of Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002) if his capacity has non empty
core and if his utility function is concave or linear. Ambiguity aversion in the sense
of Ghirardato and Marinacci is also characterized by a capacity with non empty
core.
4.2.2 Ambiguity aversion in Maxmin Models
The Wald maxmin model, as well as the Hurwicz model, are special cases of the
Choquet expected utility model corresponding to the capacities, respectively, ν(A) =
0, ∀A ∈ A \ {Ω} and ν(A) = 1 − α, ∀A ∈ A \ {Ω}. Thus, the Wald criterion
corresponds to ambiguity aversion in the sense of Schmeidler, and for the Hurwicz
criterion, ambiguity aversion is characterized by α = 1.
The Maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), as men-
tioned in section 3.2.1., reflects in any case ambiguity aversion, due to an ambiguity
aversion axiom, corresponding to a special case of ambiguity aversion in the sense
of Schmeidler.
In the αmaxmin model, ambiguity aversion is captured by the value of the pa-
rameter α. This model allows, in some sense, for a separation between the ambiguity
revealed (perceived) by individuals (given by the size of the set of priors C ) and the
ambiguity attitude. More precisely, an individual 1 reveals more ambiguity than 2
if the utility function u1 is a positive affine transformation of u2 and C1 ⊇ C2. For
two individuals revealing the same ambiguity, 1 is more ambiguity averse than 2 if
α1 > α2. One limit of this model is that it is impossible to compare the ambiguity
attitudes of individuals who do not reveal the same ambiguity and whose utility
functions are not identical (up to a positive affine transformation).
4.2.3 Ambiguity aversion and variational preferences
By construction, variational preferences are ambiguity averse, because they verify
the same ambiguity aversion axiom, as the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) maxmin
expected utility preferences. The intensity of ambiguity aversion is measured by the
function c(p). More precisely, applying Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) definition
of comparative ambiguity aversion, for two individuals with the same utility function
u, individual 1 is more ambiguity averse than individual 2 if c1 ≤ c2.
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4.2.4 Ambiguity and risk aversion in the smooth ambiguity model
In Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), individual’s tastes are characterized
by two utility functions, a standard utility function u transforming outcomes and a
function Φ, transforming expected utility for any possible scenario. Risk aversion
is characterized then by the shape of the utility function u and ambiguity aversion,
in the sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), by the shape of Φ. More precisely,
an individual with concave functions u and Φ is both risk and ambiguity averse. It
is possible to compare ambiguity attitudes only of individuals who have the same
attitude towards risk (that is the same utility function u). For two individuals with
the same utility function u, individual 1 is more ambiguity averse than individual 2
if and only if, for any x, −
Φ′′
1
(x)
Φ′
1
(x)
≥ −
Φ′′
2
(x)
Φ′
2
(x)
.
4.2.5 Imprecision and attitudes towards imprecise information in the
contraction model.
In Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008), attitude towards imprecision
is characterized by the function Φ(P) which determines the selected probability-
possibility set of an individual facing objective imprecision given by the set P of
probability distributions.
An individual 1 is more averse to imprecision than 2 if, for all P ∈ P, Φ1(P) ⊂
Φ2(P). In the special case of Φ(P) = αP+(1− α)s(P) this corresponds to α1 >
α2. Note that no restriction is necessary on the utility functions of the two individ-
uals.
5 Ambiguity aversion and dynamics
Since ambiguity leads to violations of the Sure-Thing Principle, defining updat-
ing and ensuring dynamic consistency for maxmin expected utility or other similar
models seems a rather complicated task, and indeed, has been subject to different
attempts and debates.
5.1 A dynamic version of the Ellsberg paradox
To understand the potential problems created by ambiguity sensitive preferences in
dynamic setting, it is instructive to start with a simple dynamic version of Ellsberg
paradox. Consider the three colors experiment, an urn containing 30 red balls and
60 other balls that are either blue or yellow. The first step consists in obtaining the
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individual’s preference over the two gambles: “win 100 if a red ball is drawn” versus
“win 100 if it is a blue one”.
The second step of the analysis consists in presenting the individual with the
dynamic choice problems illustrated below.
Figure 1: Dynamic version of Ellsberg three-color urn
Consider the left-hand tree: the choice of the upper branch at the choice node
corresponds to the gamble “win 100 if a red ball is drawn”. The choice of the
lower branch corresponds to the gamble “win 100 if a blue ball is drawn”. Thus an
individual with the typical static Ellsberg preferences, would plan to choose up at
the choice node in the left-hand tree.
Consider now the right-hand tree, where the choice of the upper branch at the
choice node corresponds to the gamble “win 100 if a red or a yellow ball is drawn”.
The choice of the lower branch corresponds to the gamble “win 100 if a blue or
a yellow ball is drawn”. Thus, an individual with the typical Ellsberg preferences
would plan to choose down at the choice node in the right-hand tree.
At this point, goes the argument, an individual with Ellsberg-type preferences
will be in trouble. Suppose his preference in the first step had been for the gamble
“win 100 if a red ball is drawn”. If nature were to choose down at the initial chance
node in the right-hand tree, the individual would reverse his original plan of choosing
down in favor of choosing up. In short, his behavior will be dynamically inconsistent,
as he will fail to follow the path he decided ex ante.
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5.2 Consequentialism and backward induction
This inconsistency can be explained by the non relevance of consequentialism. Fol-
lowing Hammond (1988), consequentialism means that the individual would act, at
any point in time, as if he had started out with the rest of the tree (choice node in
our illustration): all what has not been realized can be safely ignored as it does not
affect the choice of a consequentialist agent. Consequentialism is characterized by
the following two properties: (i) the preference relation conditional on the realiza-
tion of an event E depends only on E, and (ii) when evaluating an act f conditional
upon the realization of an event E, outcomes in states outside of E do not matter.
The assumption of consequentialism is implicitly assumed in the argument pre-
sented above that “establishes” the alleged dynamic inconsistency of ambiguity
averse decision makers. Indeed, consider an individual at the root of the dynamic
decision problem illustrated in figure 2 and assume that consequentialism is retained.
Figure 2: Strategic representation of Ellbserg three-color urn
Thus, the Ellsberg-type individual will choose “win if B or Y” at the decision
node. Now, suppose that at period 1, the decision maker is told wether or not the
color drawn is Y . The decision problem is now illustrated in figure 3.
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Figure 3: Arrival of information in Ellsberg three-color urn
Then, our individual prefers “win if R”. Consequently, considering the decision
tree on figure 3 and assuming that it is solved by backward induction, our Ellsbergian
individual prefers “win if R”.
Machina (1989) and Mac Clennen (1990) propose “to avoid consequentialism”.
For Machina, it would be odd to impose that dynamic preferences satisfy some form
of dynamic separability (i.e., consequentialism) while ambiguity aversion rests pre-
cisely on the fact that preferences need not be separable across events (as exemplified
by Ellsberg example).
Recently, some authors have proposed different ways to reconcile dynamic con-
sistency and behavior under ambiguity as illustrated previously. We can distinguish
two categories of models. First, there are models on updating rules for ambiguity
sensitive preferences. In these models, behavior is naively inconsistent, in the sense
that an ex ante choice of what to do contingent on the event {B,R} may differ from
what will actually be chosen when and if that event occurs. Second, some papers
propose characterizations of recursive versions of the maxmin expected utility model
and of the second order belief model.
5.3 Updating multiple priors
As we saw previously, maxmin expected utility is a leading model of ambiguity
aversion. Many papers have examined updating rules for these preferences. Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1993) axiomatize a large class of rules for updating sets of priors
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(see also Jaffray (1994) and Siniscalchi (2009)). This class includes both maximum
likelihood and full Bayesian updating. The logic behind these two rules are simple
to express. The maximum likelihood updating rule singles out the distributions ac-
cording to which the realized (conditioning) event is the most likely and drops all
the other distributions from the set of priors. The updated set of priors thus con-
sists of the former distributions, updated according to Bayes rule. The full Bayesian
updating rule simply consists in taking as the updated set of priors the set of all
priors, updated according to Bayes rule. These updating rules may lead to “dynamic
inconsistencies” in the presence of ambiguity (note that consequentialism is auto-
matically satisfied with these two updating rules). Indeed, as shown in Ghirardato
(2002), violations of the sure thing principle imply dynamic inconsistencies, when
consequentialism is satisfied.
Machina (1989) argues that for preferences that are “non separable”, one should
abandon consequentialism and let conditional preferences depend on the optimal
plan. Epstein and LeBreton (1993) precisely do that. However, their result is
somewhat negative since they show that if conditional preferences –that could now
depend on the optimal plan– are based on beliefs, then dynamic consistency implies
probabilistic sophistication (and hence, ambiguity neutrality according to Epstein’s
definition).
This has led Hanany and Klibanoff (2009) to propose a different class of updating
rules. Following Machina (1989) advice (for models under risk), their analysis drops
consequentialism (actually, drops only the property (i) mentioned above) but in a
more “extreme way” than Epstein and LeBreton (1993). They then achieve dynamic
consistency, by having the conditional preferences at each node depend on the event,
on the (ex ante) optimal decision taken as well as the choice set for which this decision
is optimal. Then dynamic consistency is ensured for any multiple prior model.
5.4 Backward induction
Skiadas (1998) first axiomatized a subjective version of recursive utility by consider-
ing a multi-period consumption-information profiles. Epstein and Schneider (2003b)
consider a model of recursive maxmin expected utility preferences and explicitly im-
pose dynamic consistency with respect to a pre-specified filtration. The essential
axioms are that conditional orderings (i) satisfy the Gilboa-Schmeidler axioms, (ii)
are connected by dynamic consistency, and (iii) do not depend on unrealized parts
of the decision tree and depend only on consumption in states of the world that can
still occur. They thus retain consequentialism and restrict dynamic consistency to a
fixed, pre-specified collection of events. They show that this structure implies that
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the set of priors have a property they label “rectangularity”.
Hayashi (2005) axiomatizes a form of recursive utility on intertemporal consump-
tion that permits a distinction between three concepts: intertemporal substitution,
risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. This model has two special cases: (i) the
recursive model of risk preference by Kreps and Porteus (1978), Epstein and Zin
(1989); (ii) the intertemporal model of multiple-priors utility by Epstein and Schnei-
der (2003b). Recently, Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2009b) proposed a model
of recursive preferences over intertemporal plans, extending the smooth ambiguity
model developed in Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) to a setting involving
dynamic decision making. Finally, we should mention the work of Siniscalchi (2009)
which does not fall under the heading of recursive models. He analyzes sophisticated
dynamic choice for ambiguity-sensitive decision makers. Sophistication can be for-
mulated as an assumption on preferences over decision trees that does not restrict
the decision maker’s preferences over acts.
5.5 Learning
Somewhat related to the issue raised in this section, one could wonder whether
ambiguity should not disappear in the long run. If ambiguity takes the form of
uncertainty about the data generating process, isn’t it the case that the mere rep-
etition of draws from that data generating process should be enough to fully learn
it?
Dow and Werlang (1994) addresses the issue of the law of large number under
ambiguity and show in what sense learning can or cannot occur. Marinacci (1999)
provides a thorough analysis of this. In a series of recent contributions Epstein and
co-authors study further this issue and show that the Bayesian model of learning is
but one extreme of a more general class of learning models in complex environment
(see in particular, Epstein and Schneider (2003a) and (2007), and Epstein and Seo
(2009a) and (2009b)).
6 Experimental evidence
In this section, we focus on the empirical (mostly experimental) literature on indi-
viduals’ behavior in presence of uncertainty. Many factors can explain uncertainty
attitudes (personality traits, psychological environment, decision context,...). We
pay more attention to the measure of ambiguity aversion than to its determinants.
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6.1 Attitudes toward uncertainty
Since Ellsberg’s paper, a host of papers have studied attitudes regarding ambiguity.
The evidence on ambiguity aversion has been mixed. Raiffa (1961) argues that a
rational decision maker should not be ambiguity averse. Heath and Tversky (1991)
establish that when they feel competent in the domain under consideration, subjects
tend to be ambiguity seeking, not averse. Fox and Tversky (1995) find that ambi-
guity aversion disappears when individuals evaluate a single gamble: the subjects
asked about their willingness to pay for a bet in the unknown urn did not provide
an answer different from the subjects who were asked about their willingness to pay
for a bet in the known urn. Only when the subjects were asked to evaluate both
bets did they make a significantly different assessments of the bets. See also Chow
and Sarin (2002).
Yates and Zukowski (1976), Curley and Yates (1985) on the other hand report
significant ambiguity aversion, through the elicitation of willingness to bet in vari-
ous (informational) circumstances. Dealing with complete ignorance (no information
given on the composition of the experimental urn) Cohen, Jaffray, and Said (1985)
find a variety of behavior (including ambiguity seeking). They also find an absence
of correlation between risk and ambiguity attitudes. Camerer and Weber (1992)
reviewed the many studies that have examined how individuals react to ambiguity.
These different studies among others show that ambiguity aversion is more pertinent
in gains than in losses. Cohen, Jaffray, and Said (1987) showed that for a majority
of subjects, attitude in the gain domain is not correlated to the one in loss domain.
More recently, Di Mauro and Maffioletti (2004) confirmed the existence of a “re-
flection effect” in both risky and ambiguous tasks. Du and Budescu (2005) found
strong ambiguity aversion in the gain domain but close to ambiguity neutrality in
the loss domain. Lauriola and Levin (2001) report the results of an experiment in
which they ask subjects to choose between a completely unknown urn and a known
urn, with the odds of winning changing from one question to another. They find a
positive correlation between risk and imprecision attitudes in the loss domain but
none in the gain domain. Chakravarty and Roy (2009) find a positive correlation
between risk and ambiguity aversion in the domain of gains but not in the loss one.
Cohen, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2009) found significant ambiguity aversion in both
a student and a “general” population. They find no correlation among measures
of risk and ambiguity aversion. Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman, and Meijers (2009)
find that men and women act similarly in face of low ambiguity, but that women
are more ambiguity averse than men in situations of high ambiguity. They also find
that psychological variables explain none of the differences in ambiguity aversion
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among subjects.
Other studies have looked at non-student population. Guiso and Jappelli (2008)
conducted a survey on some Italian bank’s clients. They find a positive correlation
between answers to questions about risk and imprecision attitude. They relate this
to modes of decision making (intuitive vs. reasoned). Cabantous (2007) surveyed
insurance professionals and found that imprecision aversion was pervasive in this
population. She also finds that sources of ambiguity (conflict of expert opinion
or imprecision) matter. Burks, Carpenter, Gotte, and Rustichini (2008) use data
collected among truck drivers and show that there is a positive and strong correlation
between risk and ambiguity aversion. They show that a common factor, cognitive
ability, explain many features of these subjects. Potamites and Zhang (2007) present
a field experiment on ambiguity aversion among investors in China. Their data shows
a substantial heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion among this population, ranging
from high ambiguity aversion to ambiguity seeking. Akay, Martinsson, Medhin, and
Trautmann (2009) ran experiment on two populations: the usual western students
population and Ethiopian peasants. They find similar ambiguity aversion in the
two populations (while Ethiopian peasants are much more risk averse). Poor health
increases both ambiguity and risk aversion. Keller, Sarin, and Sounderpandian
(2007) examine willingness to pay for gambles involving risk and ambiguity made
by individuals and dyads (marriage partners, business partners) who exhibit more
complex attitudes toward risk and ambiguity. They find that dyads display risk
aversion and ambiguity aversion.
Maffioletti and Schmidt (2008) find that the elicitation method matters and ob-
serve quite a few “preference reversals” depending on which method is used. Traut-
mann, Vieider, and Wakker (2009) also find preference reversal for ambiguity averse
preferences.
Little has been done in dynamics. Liu and Colman (2009) study ambiguity
aversion in a repeated game approach. It appears that participants chose ambiguous
options significantly more frequently in repeated-choice than in single-choice. This
suggests that repetition diminishes the effect of ambiguity aversion. Dominiak,
Du¨rschz, and Lefort (2009) run a dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment and find that
subjects act more often in line with consequentialism than with dynamic consistency.
6.2 Model comparison
A by now fairly robust result in the domain of experimental economics is that
behavior is very heterogeneous among individuals. Not only are ambiguity attitudes
diverse; the various implications of the different models presented in section 3 can
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be used to estimate which model best fits which individual behavior.
Halevy (2007) proposed an experiment that permits to distinguish between four
models of ambiguity aversion (subjective expected utility, maxmin expected utility,
recursive non-expected utility, and recursive expected utility). Subjects are asked
their reservation values for four different urns, representing different types of uncer-
tainty. The conclusion is that no single model predicts all the observed behaviors.
Ahn, Choi, Gale, and Kariv (2009) estimate the parameters of four models of choice
under ambiguity (subjective expected utility, maxmin expected utility, recursive ex-
pected utility (of the smooth ambiguity type) and α-maxmin expected utility). They
use some portfolio-choice problem to analyze behavior. They find that although
individual preferences are heterogeneous, about two-thirds of the subjects have a
positive degree of ambiguity aversion. They also find that a significant fraction of
subjects behave according to the α-maxmin expected utility model, and another
significant fraction of subjects’ behavior is best explained by the second-order prior
model of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). Hayashi and Wada (forthcom-
ing) find that subjects are sensitive to the dimension and the shape of the sets of
probability distributions given to them and not only to the worst- and best-case, thus
violating the α-maxmin models. They also show that the presence of non-extreme
points matter, in contradiction to what the contraction model assumes. They find
mixed support for the second-order prior model. Andersen, Fountain, Harrison, and
Rutstrom (2009) estimate a second-order prior model in which they jointly elicit
risk and ambiguity attitude as well as subjective beliefs. They show that ambigu-
ity aversion is quantitatively significant. They also show that attitude towards risk
and uncertainty can be different, quantitatively and qualitatively. Hey, Lotito, and
Maffioletti (2008) find results that are rather discouraging for the recent theories
and favor simple rules of thumb. They use a new device to generate ambiguity (a
Bingo blower) that does not induce second order probability thinking nor fear of
manipulation.
Using variants of the Ellsberg urn problems to estimate parameter values or
functional forms for individual subjects, Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido, and Wakker
(2009) capture attitudes towards uncertainty and ambiguity by using a choice-based
probabilities approach. They find heterogeneity in subjects’ preferences both in an
Ellsberg urn experiment and in experiments using naturally occurring uncertainties.
They also implement the “source dependent” approach and manage to estimate
the source dependent weighting function that explain apparently ambiguous averse
choices.
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6.3 Ambiguity in economic situations
We finally mention some work that has been done beyond simple experimental
choices that often consist in artificial draws from bizarre urns. Indeed, eventually,
all the models discussed so far aim at giving some new insights into “real” economic
issues. Discussing the theoretical work in that direction is beyond the scope of this
survey. The papers we mention here on the other hand, give interesting results in
some simple, controlled, examples.
Camerer and Kunreuther (1989) consider an insurance market and use bidding
between insurees and insurers. Aversion toward ambiguity plays an important role
for explaining the observed behavior. Ambiguity has an impact on prices. This
result is in line with Hogarth and Kunreuther (1985) who observe that insurance
premia are higher in presence of ambiguity. They also find that ambiguity aversion
is a decreasing function of the probability of loss; see also Kunreuther, Hogarth, and
Meszaros (1993). Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, and Zame (2009) study the
impact of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion on portfolio holdings and asset prices
in a financial market experiment. They obtain that ambiguity aversion can be
observed in competitive markets and that ambiguity aversion matters for portfolio
choices and for prices. They also observe that there is substantial heterogeneity in
ambiguity preferences and that there is a positive correlation between risk aversion
and ambiguity aversion. Kozhan and Salmon (2009) explain behavior in foreign
exchange markets by using the multiple prior approach. Their empirical model
based on daily GBP/USD data over a 10 year period, test the investors’ ambiguity-
aversion. They find significant evidence of uncertainty aversion.
7 Conclusion
As we hope we conveyed to the reader, the field of decision under uncertainty is
very rich and expanding rapidly. The basis of most advances –the natural fact that
acting in a situation in which one has very little knowledge of the odds of different
scenarios is very different from acting when the odds are known– is so intuitive
that it even made it to a best seller like Robert Ludlum’s The Ambler Warning
(2005), where Ellsberg two color urn experiment is accurately described. The field
nevertheless definitively needs more applications in the realm of concrete economics
phenomena. We hope that this survey, by providing an introduction to the literature
will encourage some readers to tackle this important enterprise.
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